Differential Privacy is one of the strongest privacy guarantees, which allows the release of useful information about any sensitive dataset. However, it provides the same level of protection for all elements in the data universe. In this paper, we consider d X -privacy, an instantiation of the privacy notion introduced in [1], which allows specifying a separate privacy budget for each pair of elements in the data universe. We describe a systematic procedure to tailor any existing differentially private mechanism into a d X -private variant for the case of linear queries. For the resulting d X -private mechanisms, we provide theoretical guarantees on the tradeoff between utility and privacy, and show that they always outperform their vanilla counterpart. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our procedure, by evaluating the proposed d X -private Laplace mechanism on both synthetic and real datasets using a set of randomly generated linear queries.
Introduction
Differential privacy [2] is a formal notion of privacy that allows a trustworthy data curator, in possession of sensitive data from a large number of individuals, to approximately answer a query submitted by an analyst while maintaining individual privacy. Intuitively, differential privacy ensures that the data analyst knows no more about any individual in the dataset after the analysis, than she knew before the start of the analysis. One common mechanism for achieving differential privacy is to inject random noise to the answer of a query that is carefully calibrated according to the sensitivity of the query and a global privacy budget . Sensitivity, in this case, is defined as the maximum amount of change in answer to a query considering all neighboring datasets, i.e., datasets differing in one row or equivalently having Hamming distance of one. One limitation of this definition is that it provides the same level of protection for all elements in the data universe X .
In specific domains, it might be more natural to measure the distinguishability between two datasets by some generic metric d X : X × X → R + instead of just Hamming distance. For instance, consider the location-based systems where it might be acceptable to disclose coarse-grained information about an individual's location instead of his exact location. In this case, the geographical distance would be an appropriate measure of distinguishability [3] . There are other scenarios where some attributes of the dataset may need more protection than others, and vice versa. As an example, consider a classification problem with instance space X ⊂ R d where specific features of X are highly sensitive than others (maybe due to fairness requirements [4] ). In this case, d X (u, v) = d i=1 i u i = v i , ∀u, v ∈ X might be a reasonable choice for the metric.
In the applications mentioned above, the standard differential privacy (with global privacy budget) is too strong and compromises much in the utility. To address this limitation, several relaxations of differential privacy have been proposed recently [1, 5] . In this work, we consider d X -privacy, an instantiation of the privacy notion introduced in [1] , for statistical databases. Intuitively, d X -privacy allows specifying a separate privacy budget for each pair of elements u, v in the data universe X , given by the value d X (u, v). In Section 2.2, we formally define the d X -privacy and discuss its properties.
Our primary objective is to develop d X -private mechanisms that provide a good trade-off (w.r.t. given utility measure) between privacy and utility. Note that [1] have only constructed universally optimal mechanisms [6] under specific d X metrics (such as Manhattan metric) for some particular class of queries such as count, sum, average, and percentage queries. In particular, we want to tailor any existing differential private mechanisms to satisfy d X -privacy. For this, we propose a utility measure dependent pre-processing strategy which applies to any data universe X and any choice of the metric d X .
Main Contributions
We describe a meta procedure (for any metric) to tailor any existing differentially private mechanism into a d X -private variant for the case of linear queries. The main challenge is that the privacy budget, i.e., d X , is specified on the input universe X , whereas the noise is added to the query response which belongs to the outcome space. Thus we need to somehow propagate the information contained in the metric to the output space.
The main component of our new mechanisms is a pre-processing optimization (depending on the utility measure of interest) to choose the model parameters of the mechanism. We have provided the explicit formulation of this pre-processing optimization problem for some commonly used utility measures (under any metric). In general, these problems are non-convex and computationally challenging. But we show that for certain loss functions the optimization problem can be approximately solved using heuristic approaches (e.g., Algorithm 3 for squared loss).
Based on the meta procedure, we describe d X -private variants of several well-known -differentially private algorithms (both online and offline). In particular, we illustrate the d X -private variants of the Laplace [2] and Exponential [7] mechanisms, as well as the SmallDB [8] and MWEM [9] mechanisms for generating synthetic datasets.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of d X -privacy in terms of utility, by evaluating the proposed d Xprivate Laplace mechanism on both synthetic and real datasets using a set of randomly generated linear queries. In both cases we define the d X metric as the Euclidean distance between elements in the data universe. Our results show that the utility from the d X -private variant of the Laplace mechanism is higher than its vanilla counterpart, with some specific queries showing significant improvement. We extend our techniques to Blowfish (Distance Threshold model) [5] privacy notion as well, and show similar improvement.
Background and d X -Privacy
This section gives the background on differential privacy and associated concepts of linear queries, sensitivity, and utility. We also introduce d X -privacy and its relation to other privacy notions.
Notation Let [n] := {1, . . . , n} for n ∈ N, and R + := [0, ∞). We write P = 1 if P is true and P = 0 otherwise. Let x i denote the ith coordinate of the vector x, and A i,: denote the ith row of the matrix A. We denote the inner product of two vectors x, y ∈ R n by x, y . The k-element vector of all ones is denoted 1 k := (1, . . . , 1) . For two vectors a, b ∈ R n , the operation a b represents element-wise multiplication. For a ∈ R n and B ∈ R n×d , the operation a B represents row-wise scalar multiplication of B by the associated entry of a. For a vector a 0 represents that the vector is element-wise non-negative. Hamming distance is defined as x − y H := 
Differential Privacy
Let X denote the data universe and N := |X | its size. A database D of n rows is modelled as a histogram x ∈ N N (with x 1 = n), where x i encodes the number of occurrences of the ith element of the universe X . Two neighboring databases D and D (from X n ) that differ in a single row ( D − D H = 1) correspond to two histograms x and x (from N N ) satisfying x − x 1 = 2.
A mechanism M : N N × Q Y (where Y is the outcome space, and Q is the query class) is a randomized algorithm which takes a dataset x ∈ N N and a query q : N N → Y, and answers with some a ∈ Y. Informally, a mechanism satisfies differential privacy if the densities of the output distributions on inputs x, x ∈ N N with x − x 1 ≤ 2 are pointwise within an exp ( ) multiplicative factor of each other. Here > 0 is a parameter that measures the strength of the privacy guarantee (smaller being a stronger guarantee). Definition 1 (Differential Privacy, [2] ). A mechanism M : N N × Q Y is called -differentially private if for all x, x ∈ N N such that x − x 1 ≤ 2, for every q ∈ Q, and for every measurable S ⊆ Y, we have
d X -Privacy
Here we consider a relaxed privacy notion, which is a particular case of the definition from [1] , for statistical databases. Given a metric d X on the data universe, a mechanism satisfies d X -privacy if the densities of the output distributions on input histograms x, x ∈ N N with x − x 1 ≤ 2 and differ on i, j-th entries are pointwise within an exp (d X (i, j)) multiplicative factor of each other.
, we recover the standard -differential privacy.
Most of the desirable properties of differential privacy is carried over to d X -privacy as well, with suitable generalization. Fact 1 (Properties of d X -Privacy). The d X -privacy satisfies the following desirable properties:
where V is the set of indices in which x and x differ.
d X -privacy can naturally express the indistinguishability requirement that cannot be represented by the standard notion of distance such as Hamming distance. But the metric d X in the above definition must be carefully defined to achieve different privacy goals. [3] have used the Euclidean metric with the discrete Cartesian plane as the data universe, for location-based systems. Blowfish [5] privacy (without constraints) considers a natural metric based on a minimum spanning tree with the elements of the data universe as vertices, and with equal edge weights. Here the adversary may better distinguish the points farther apart in the tree, than those that are closer. But when some elements of the data universe are highly sensitive than others, non-uniform edge weights can capture this priority requirement.
Our main contribution is the construction of utility measure dependent d X -private mechanisms (confer Section 3). Note that [1] have only constructed universally optimal mechanisms under certain d X metrics (such as Manhattan metric) for some special class of queries such as count, sum, average, and percentage queries.
Linear Queries and Sensitivity
Our focus is on the inherent trade-off between privacy and accuracy when answering a large number of linear queries over histograms. Linear queries include some natural classes of queries such as range queries [10, 11] and contingency tables [12, 13] , and serves as the basis of a wide range of data analysis and learning algorithms (see [14] for some examples). A linear query is specified by a function q mapping dataset (histogram) to a real value. Formally, given a query vector q ∈ R N , a linear query over the histogram x ∈ N N can be expressed as q (x) = q, x . A set of k linear queries can be represented by a query matrix Q ∈ R k×N with the vector Qx ∈ R k giving the correct answers to the queries.
For d X -privacy, we consider a generalized notion of global sensitivity (defined in [2] ): Definition 3. For i, j ∈ [N ] (with i = j), the generalized global sensitivity of a query q ∈ Q (w.r.t.
· ) is defined as follows
Consider a multi-linear query
, for a single linear query q (x) = q, x , we have ∆ q · (i, j) = |q i − q j |. Thus, the generalized notion is defined separately for each pair i, j of elements in X .
Laplace and Exponential Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism is defined as follows: Definition 4 (Laplace Mechanism, [2] ). For a query function q : N N → R with 1 -sensitivity ∆ q 1 , Laplace mechanism will output
where
, and Lap (λ) is a distribution with probability density function f (x) =
The Laplace mechanism satisfies the -differential privacy, but it satisfies d X -privacy only with
. This would result in large noise addition, and eventually unnecessary compromise on overall utility.
Given some arbitrary range R, the exponential mechanism is defined with respect to some utility function u : N N × R → R, which maps database/output pairs to utility scores. The sensitivity notion that we are interested here is given by: Definition 5. For i, j ∈ [N ] (with i = j) and u : R N × R → R, the generalized utility sensitivity is defined as follows
Formally, the exponential mechanism is: Definition 6 (The Exponential Mechanism, [7] ). The exponential mechanism M Exp, ∆u (x, u) selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp 2∆u · u (x, r) .
The exponential mechanism also satisfies the -differential privacy, but it satisfies d X -privacy only with
Utility
In the differential privacy literature, the performance of a mechanism is usually measured in terms of its worst-case total expected error, defined as follows:
Here the expectation is taken over the internal coin tosses of the mechanism itself.
In this paper, we are mainly interested in the worst case expected p -error (defined by p (y,ŷ) :=
) for p ∈ {1, 2, ∞}, and It is also common to analyze high probability bounds on the accuracy of the privacy mechanisms.
N , and parameters α > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1), the mechanism M is (α, β)-accurate for q on x under the · -norm if
where · -norm can be any vector norm definition. In our analysis, we consider the · 1 -norm and the · ∞ -norm.
d X -Private Mechanisms for Linear Queries
In this section, we design d X -private mechanisms by extending some of the well knowndifferentially private (noise adding) mechanisms. The main challenge here is that the privacy budget d X is defined on the input data universe X (⊆ R N ) and the noise is added to the query response which belongs to the outcome space Y (⊆ R k ). The query response y ∈ Y contains only the aggregate information (summary statistic) about the elements of the input database x ∈ X n , and it does not capture the d X -metric structure in the input domain X . Thus we need to somehow propagate the d X (·, ·) information from X to Y.
Given a dataset x ∈ N N , and a query q : N N → Y ⊆ R k , our approach (meta procedure) to design a d X -private (noise adding) mechanism can be described as follows:
1. Choose the (approximately optimal) model parameters c ∈ R k and q :
, and c 0. 2. Then use an existing -differentially private mechanism with (c q , c) in place of q,
The model parameters q and c are chosen by (approximately) solving the following pre-processing optimization problem (i.e. (q , c) :
where f ,M (q , c; q, n) is a surrogate function of the utility measure that we are interested in. Note that this pre-processing optimization depends only on the data universe X (or [N ]), the query set Q, and the database size n, but not on the dataset x. Thus we don't compromise any privacy during the optimization procedure. More over, we have to do the pre-processing optimization only once in an offline manner (for given X , Q, and n). The number of constraints in the optimization problem (3) can be exponentially large (≈ 2 N ), but depending on the structure of the d X -metric the constraint count can be significantly reduced.
Next we apply the above described abstract meta procedure in extending some -differential privacy mechanisms under different loss measures such as squared loss and absolute loss. We first show that the resulting mechanisms are in fact d X -private, and then we formulate the appropriate pre-processing optimization problems (3) for them.
d X -Private Laplace Mechanism
For a given query q : R N → Y ⊂ R k over the histogram x ∈ R N , consider the following variant of Laplace mechanism (with the model parameters q : R N → R k , and c ∈ R k which depend on the utility function of the task):
. When q (x) = Qx, we choose Q ∈ R k×N and c ∈ R k as the model parameters i.e., q (x) = Q x. Below we show that the above variant of Laplace mechanism satisfies the d X -privacy under a sensitivity bound condition.
The sensitivity bound condition of the above proposition for a multi-linear query Q (x) = Q x can be written as:
. The next proposition characterizes the performance of the M Lap,c (·, c q ) mechanism under different choices of utility measures: Proposition 2. Let Q : R N → R k be a multi-linear query of the form Q (x) = Qx, and let
where err (M, Q) is defined in (2).
2. When p (y, y ) = y − y p , we have
3. ∀δ ∈ (0, 1], with probability at least 1 − δ we have
Based on the upper bounds that we obtained in the previous proposition, we can formulate the pre-processing optimization problem F pre-opt (q, n, d X (·, ·) , ) to select the model parameters c and Q of the M Lap,c (·, c Q ) mechanism as follows:
The objective function of the above optimization problem depends on the utility function that we are interested in. For example, when
. In summary, the d X -private Laplace mechanism, under 2 2 -error function, can be described as follows:
1. Choose the model parameters (Q , c) by approximately solving the pre-processing optimization problem , and thus our framework is able to recover standard -differential privacy mechanisms as well.
d X -Private Exponential Mechanism
For a given utility function u : N N × R → R over the histogram x ∈ R N , consider the following variant of exponential mechanism (with the model parameters u : N N × R → R, and c ∈ R which will be chosen later based on the utility function): Definition 9. The mechanism M Exp,c (x, u ) selects and outputs an element r ∈ R with probability proportional to exp
.
Here we note that for ease of presentation, we do not consider using c r ∈ R for each r ∈ R. The following theorem provides a sufficient condition for the above mechanism to satisfy d X -privacy.
For a given histogram x and a given utility measure u : R N × R → R, let u (x) = max r∈R u (x, r) denote the maximum utility score of any element r ∈ R with respect to histogram x. Below we generalize the Theorem 3.11 from [15] : Theorem 2. Fixing a database x, let R u = {r ∈ R : u (x, r) = u (x)} denote the set of elements in R which attain utility score u (x). Also define δ u,u := max x,r |u (x, r) − u (x, r)|. Then for Z = M Exp,c (x, u ), with probability at least 1 − e −t , we have
Since we always have R u ≥ 1, we get
The exponential mechanism is a natural building block for designing complex -differentially private mechanisms. Next we consider two instantiations of the above variant of exponential mechanism, namely small database mechanism [8] , and multiplicative weights exponential mechanism [9] . The main trick is that we need to choose appropriate R and the utility function u .
d X -Private Small Database Mechanism
Here we consider the problem of answering a large number of real valued linear queries q : N N → R of the form q (x) = q, x (where q ∈ R N , and x ∈ N N ) from class Q via synthetic histogram/database release. For this problem [8] have proposed and studied a simple -differentially private small database mechanism, which is an instantiation of exponential mechanism. They have used a utility function u :
Now we extend the mechanism developed in [8] to obtain a d X -private version of it using the model parameters Q and c ∈ R (which are determined later). Algorithm 1 is a modified version
Let u : N N × R → R be defined to be:
Sample And Output y ∈ R with the mechanism M Exp,c (x, u )
of Algorithm 4 from [15] , where the transformation from Q to Q is one-to-one (thus we have |Q | = |Q|). When answering a query q ∈ Q over x, we need to output cq (y) where q ∈ Q is the matching element of q and y is the output of the d X -private small database mechanism (Algorithm 1).
Following proposition provides the d X -privacy characterization of the small database mechanism.
The following proposition and theorem characterize the performance of the d X -private small database mechanism. Proposition 4 (Proposition 4.4, [15] ). Let Q be any class of linear queries. Let y be the database output by SmallDB (x, Q , c, α). Then with probability 1 − β:
Theorem 3 (Theorem 4.5, [15] ). By the appropriate choice of α, letting y be the database output by SmallDB x, Q , c, α 2 , we can ensure that with probability 1 − β:
From the upper bound of the above theorem, the model parameters Q and c of the small database mechanism can be chosen through the following pre-processing optimization problem:
where f (Q , c; Q, n) = n max q∈Q q − cq ∞ + cn 2 16 log N log |Q| + 4 log
. See Appendix B, for a brief discussion on the (non-convex) pre-processing optimization problems (5), and (8).
d X -Private Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism
As in the case of small database mechanism, here also we consider the problem of answering a large number of real valued linear queries in d X -private manner. Algorithm 2 is a simple modification of Algorithm 1 from [9] . Following theorem provides the d X -privacy characterization of the MWEM mechanism. Theorem 4. If q i − q j ≤ d X (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q ∈ Q , then the MWEM mechanism is d X -private.
The following theorem characterizes the performance of the MWEM mechanism. Theorem 5 (Theorem 2.2, [9] ). For any dataset x, set of linear queries Q, T ∈ N, and c > 0, with probability at least 1 − 2T / |Q|, MWEM produces y such that Exponential Mechanism: Sample a query q t ∈ Q using the M Exp,2cT (x, u t ) mechanism and the score function u t : N N × Q → R given by u t (x, q ) := c q y t−1 − q (x) .
2.
Laplace Mechanism: Let measurement m t = cq t (x) + Y with Y ∼ Lap (2cT ).
3.
Multiplicative Weights: Let y t be n times the distribution whose entries satisfy ∀i ∈
The model parameters Q and c of the MWEM mechanism can be chosen through the optimization problem 8 with f (Q , c; Q, n) = n max q∈Q cq − q ∞ + 
Experiments
Here we demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework via experiments on both synthetic and real data. We will show that in many situations, we can drastically improve the accuracy of the noisy answer compared to the traditional differentially private mechanisms.
Single Linear Queries over Synthetic Data
In order to evaluate our mechanism, we first consider randomly generated single linear queries (q : N N → R). To that end, we compare the following two mechanisms: (a) the -differentially private Laplace mechanism (with
, and (b) the d X -private Laplace mechanism (with the model parameters c ∈ R and
, under the experimental setup given below.
Data and Privacy Matrix:
We generate a random dataset (histogram) with n = 10, 000 records from a data universe of size N = 50. We then randomly sample N distinct two-dimensional points
2 , and associate each point (u i , v i ) with an element (i ∈ [N ]) of the data universe. The sampled data universe elements are shown in Figure 1a . We define the privacy matrix
Random Queries: We evaluate the two mechanisms over 1000 random single linear queries, where the query coefficients are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over the real interval [0, 1].
Performance Measure: We measure the performance of the mechanisms by the root mean squared error (RMSE; between the private response and the actual output) on the above generated data, i.e., we consider the squared loss function (y, y ) = y − y 
Since n is very large, by fixing cq = q in the above problem, we obtain an approximately optimal (closed form) solution given by c = max i,j |qi−qj | d X (i,j) , and q = 1 c q. Improvement Factor: For a given single linear query q, the improvement factor of the d X -private Laplace mechanism compared to the baseline ( -differentially private Laplace) mechanism is defined as IF (q) := ∆ q 1 / c . This factor is just a ratio between the scales (λ) of the noise (Lap (λ)) added by these two mechanisms. Then for each random query (1000 in total), we compute the improvement factor. The resulted values are presented in a histogram form in Figure 1b , where the d X -private mechanism exhibits significant improvement in utility compared to the baseline mechanism. We note that the improvement factor is not a reasonable performance measure when the spread of the elements of the data universe is profoundly non-uniform (e.g., two points are infinitesimally close to each other). But in both our real and synthetic data, the elements are (roughly) uniformly spread.
Multi-Linear Queries over Synthetic Data
We consider the same data, privacy matrix, and performance measure (squared loss) used in Section 4.1. But here we work with random multi-linear queries given by Q ∈ R K×N , where we vary K from 1 to 10. The entries of the query matrix are either drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1] or a random binary number.
Again, we compare the d X -private Laplace mechanism (4) to the -differentially private Laplace mechanism (1), with = min i,j d X (i, j). The model parameters Q ∈ R K×N and c ∈ R K of the d X -private Laplace mechanism (4) can be obtained from the optimization problem (5) with loss function (y, y ) = y − y 
. {near optimal scale of the noise for query Q k,: , if the whole privacy budget is consumed by it.} 2.
d
.{distribute the privacy budget between each query, based on c k 's.} 3.
c k = max i,j
. {calculate the scale of the noise for each single linear query by considering the privacy budget allocated to them.} 4.
. {calculate the remaining (total) privacy budget.} 5.
T = 1 c1 , . . . , 
In particular, we consider the following three different strategies to choose c ∈ R K (with Q k,:
, in a way that satisfy the constraints of the optimization above problem:
i.e., we share the privacy budget equally (
) between the queries.
Strategy 2
, ∀k ∈ [K], i.e., we add same scale noise to all the query response components. 3. Strategy 3 : We obtain c via Algorithm 3.
For a given multi-linear query Q ∈ R K×N , the improvement factor of the d X -private Laplace mechanism (4) compared to the baseline ( -differentially private Laplace, (1)) mechanism is defined
, we randomly draw 100 query matrices Q ∈ R K×N , and compute the (averaged) improvement factor IF (Q) for the above three different choices of c. The results are shown in Figure 1c and 1d. We can see that Strategy 3 works better with queries having natural numbers as coefficients (cf. Figure 1d ). This is true since there is a high likelihood that two query coefficients are the same (i.e., q i = q j ), resulting in no depletion of the privacy budget d X (i, j).
Single Linear Queries over Real Data
As stated in [1] , when dealing with geographic locations, it might be acceptable to disclose the region of an individual. However, disclosing the precise location (town) of the individual is likely to be undesired. Thus it would be useful to have a distinguishability level that depends on the geographic distance.
(a) USA cities with more than 50k inhabitants We empirically evaluate d X -private Laplace mechanism for random single linear queries on a geolocation dataset with longitude, latitude, and elevation attributes. The dataset consists of the location and population of US cities with more than 50k inhabitants (N = 741 in total) [16, 17] .
We translate this dataset into a histogram over the towns. The 2D-locations (longitude and latitude wise) of the towns are presented in Figure 2a . We define the privacy budget d X based on the Euclidean distance on this 2D-representation.
The improvement factors of 1000 queries are presented in Figure 2b . We also tested the particular query "average elevation of an American individual's house" (the coefficient are simply the elevation d value of each city), and in this case our algorithm performed particularly well : the improvement factor is 202. That kind of improvement is possible because, there is a strong correlation between the query and the distance map : two close cities (i.e. they have a strong privacy requirement) will have close elevation values.
Experiments with Blowfish Privacy
Our general pre-processing strategy applies to any metric, thus our techniques can be extended to Blowfish (Distance Threshold model) [5] privacy notion as well. We can carefully define a d X metric for any privacy policy considered in the blowfish framework. First, we define d X such that d X (i, j) = ∞, ∀i = j, and d X (k, k) = 0, ∀k. Then for each pair of neighbors (i, j), we check if there is a secret to be protected with the blowfish policy. If so we just set d X (i, j) = (the privacy budget). Finally, we need to make sure (possibly by some transformations) that the resulting d X satisfies the triangular inequality.
We consider the same data, single linear queries, and performance measure (squared loss) used in Section 4.1. But here we work with two different privacy metrics. Given a threshold T , and a privacy parameter , define:
First, we compute the average RMSE over 1000 random single linear queries under both privacy metrics defined above (for different values of and T ). The results are shown in Figure 3 . We can see that the results under both metrics are roughly same. The higher the threshold T (i.e., more neighbors are protected), the higher is the average error. The d , and results in a higher average error for the same threshold.
Then we fix = 1, and for each random query (1000 in total), we compute the improvement factor. The resulted values are presented in a distribution form in Figure 4 . Observe that for higher threshold 
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed new d X -private mechanisms for linear queries by extending the standard -differentially private mechanisms. These new mechanisms fully utilize the privacy budgets of different elements and maximize the utility of the private response. We have empirically shown that carefully selecting the model parameters of the d X -private mechanisms (depending on the utility function and d X -metric) can result in substantial improvement upon the baseline mechanism regarding the utility. Here we also note that for statistical queries (which is a special case of linear queries), we can design d X -private mechanisms efficiently by exploiting the sum-structure. We refer the reader to Appendix A for more details.
A Statistical Queries
A statistical query on a data universe X ⊂ R d is defined by a mapping q : X → Y ⊂ R k . Abusing notation, we define the evaluation of a statistical query q on the database x ∈ X n to be the average of the predicate over the rows
When q (u) = u, ∀u ∈ X , we call it d-way marginal query. We can actually treat the statistical query as a liner query over histogram (y ∈ N N ) with query matrix Q ∈ R k×N . But we can exploit the sum-structure ( (9)) of it to design efficient algorithms. Definition 10. For u, v ∈ X (with u = v), define the generalized global sensitivity of a query q ∈ Q (w.r.t. · ) is defined as follows
The generalized global sensitivity (for u, v ∈ X ) of the statistical query q is given by
For the d-way marginal query q, we have ∆
n . Definition 11. Let X (with φ ∈ X ) be the data universe, d X : X × X → R be the privacy budget, and q : X n → Y be the query. A mechanism M : X n × Q Y is said to be d X -private iff ∀x, x ∈ X n s.t. x − x H ≤ 1, and x i = x i (for some i ∈ [n]), ∀S ⊆ Y and ∀q ∈ Q we have
we recover the standard -differential privacy, and when d X (u, v) = u ∧ v for u, v ∈ X , we recover the instance specific differential privacy notion introduced in [18] .
For a given query q : X n → Y ⊂ R k over the database x ∈ X n , consider the following variant of Laplace mechanism (with the mapping X → X , and c ∈ R k ):
Below we show that the above variant of Laplace mechanism satisfies the d X -privacy under a sensitivity bound condition.
The sensitivity bound condition of the above proposition for a statistical query q can be written as follows:
For the d-way marginal query, the above condition reduces to
The next proposition characterizes the performance of the M Lap,c (x , q) mechanism under different choices of utility measures: Proposition 6. Let q : X n → R k be a statistical query of the form q (x) = 1 n n i=1 q (x i ), and let
Now we model the following optimization problem to select the model parameters c and X → X of the M Lap,c (x , q) mechanism:
The objective function f ,M (c, X ; q, n) depends on the utility function that we are interested in. For example, when
. In fact there are two ways to design d X -private mechanisms from existing -differentially private mechanisms: either transform the query vector or the data universe. The approach we used above is X → X (that is q (u) → q (u) = q (u )). Thus we can reduce the number of variables in the pre-processing optimization by a factor of k.
Consider a privacy budget (metric) of the form
Thus in this setting, we can instantiate and relax the above optimization problem (11) in to k independent optimization problems as follows:
B Pre-processing Optimization
In section 3, we have shown that by (approximately) solving certain pre-processing optimization problems (e.g. (5), (8)), we can obtain the model parameters of the d X -private mechanisms with enhanced utility. One can easily verify that these problems are non-convex optimization problems. Recently, in the optimization and machine learning community, there is a huge interest in developing efficient algorithms for non-convex optimization problems with provable guarantees [19] . One can also observe that these pre-processing optimization problems exhibit coordinate friendly structures, and thus the coordinate descent family of algorithms [20] is a natural choice to solve them.
Consider the optimization problem (5) Recently [21] have shown that under certain conditions, the multi-convex optimization problem can be efficiently solved via a variant of cyclic block coordinate descent algorithm. Now consider the optimization problem (8) with the objective function f (c, Q ) = n max q∈Q cq − q ∞ + 20 5 2/3 n 2 log N log |Q| 1/3 c 1/3 . In this case, the objective function is both non-smooth and nonconvex, thus the resulting problem is very hard to optimize.
C Proofs
, and x j = x j , and let q ∈ Q. Let p x and p x denote the probability density functions of M Lap,c (x, q) and M Lap,c (x , q) respectively. Then for any z ∈ Y we have
where (i) follows from the triangle inequality and (ii) follows from the definition of generalized global sensitivity and due to the choice of x and x . That
Proposition 2. Let Q : R N → R k be a multi-linear query of the form Q (x) = Qx, and let
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where (i) is by triangle inequality, (ii) is due to the fact that (a + b) 2 ≤ 2a 2 + 2b 2 , (iii) is by Hölder's Inequality, (iv) is due to the fact that x 2 ≤ x 1 = n, and (v) is due to the fact that
. This completes the proof of first part.
Part 2. Consider (by the similar reasoning as of Part 1)
[|X|] = λ for X ∈ R).
Part 3. We will use the fact that if Y ∼ Lap (b), then P [|Y| ≥ t · b] = exp (−t). We have:
where the second to last equality follows from the fact that each Y i ∼ Lap (c i ). That is with probability at least 1 − δ we have
Proof. For clarity, we assume R to be finite. Let x, x ∈ R N s.t. x − x 1 ≤ 2, x i = x i and x j = x j . Then for any r ∈ R we have
Similarly,
Theorem 2. Fixing a database x, let R u = {r ∈ R : u (x, r) = u (x)} denote the set of elements in R which attain utility score u (x). Also define δ u,u := max x,r |u (x, r) − u (x, r)|. Then for
Proof.
The inequality follows from the observation that each r ∈ R with u (x, r) ≤ α has un-normalized probability mass at most exp (α/2c), and hence the entire set of such "bad" elements r has total un-normalized probability mass at most |R| exp (α/2c). In contrast, we know that there exist at least R u ≥ 1 elements with u (x, r) = u (x), and hence un-normalized probability mass R u exp ( u (x) /2c), and so this is a lower bound on the normalization term. The proof is completed by plugging in the appropriate value for α, and by noting that
and ∀q ∈ Q , then the small database mechanism is d X -private.
Proof. First we will find the condition for ∆u (i, j) ≤ cd X (i, j) , ∀i, j ∈ [N ] and ∀q ∈ Q :
|u (x, y) − u (x , y)|.
For some x, x ∈ N N such that x − x 1 ≤ 2, x i = x i , x j = x j for some i, j ∈ [N ], we have:
where (i) due to the fact that |max x |a (x)| − max x |b (x)|| ≤ max x |{|a (x)| − |b (x)|}|, (ii) is by triangle inequality, and (iii) is due to the choice of x and x . Thus we require
The Small Database mechanism is simply an instantiation of the M Exp,c (·, u ) mechanism. Therefore, privacy follows from Theorem 1.
We use the following theorem from [15] directly. Theorem 6 (Theorem 4.2, [15] ). For any finite class of linear queries
then for all x ∈ N N , there exists a y ∈ R such that: Proof. Applying the utility bounds for the M Exp,c (·, u ) mechanism (Theorem 2) with − u (x) ≥ αn (which follows from Theorem 6), we find:
|cq (x) − cq (y)| ≥ αn + 2c {ln (|R|) + t} ≤ e −t .
By noting that R, which is the set of all databases of size at most log |Q|/α 2 (since |Q | = |Q|), satisfies |R| ≤ |X | log |Q|/α 2 and by setting t = log 1 β , we get with probability 1 − β:
|cq (x) − cq (y)| ≤ αn + 2c log N log |Q| α 2 + log 1 β .
Thus with probability 1 − β we have (q ∈ Q is the one-to-one mapping of q ∈ Q): where (i) is by triangle inequality, (ii) is due to the fact that max x {a(x) + b(x)} ≤ max x a(x) + max x b(x), (iii) is by the Hölder's Inequality, and (iv) is due to the fact that x 1 = n. 
with probability 1 − β: max q∈Q |q (x) − cq (y)| ≤ n max q∈Q q − cq ∞ + αn.
Proof. By Proposition 4, we get:
|q (x) − cq (y)| ≤ n max q∈Q q − cq ∞ + α 2 n + 2c 4 log N log |Q| α 2 + log 1 β .
Setting this quantity to be at most n max q∈Q q − cq p + αn and solving for c yields (14) . Solving for α yields (13). |u (x, q ) − u (x , q )|.
C.2.2 Multiplicative Weights Exponential Mechanism
|u (x, q ) − u (x , q )| = |c |q (y) − q (x)| − c |q (y) − q (x )||
where (i) is by triangle inequality, and (ii) is due to the choice of x and x . That is we require ∆u (i, j) ≤ c q i − q j ≤ cd X (i, j) .
Thus with the above transformed class Q , if we use the M Exp,2cT (x, u ) mechanism, we get Proof. Proof is similar to that of Proposition 1. Proposition 6. Let q : X n → R k be a statistical query of the form q (x) =
